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Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of 
action-perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings 
constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion 
of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception, and that the central 
enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because it has no 
traction on socially dependent perceptions, which are essential to the role and significance of perception in 
our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism 
needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-
inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is 
properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, music, etc. More 
specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce 
of meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central 
features of socially dependent perception: attentional focus, aspects’ saliency, and modal-specific harmony-
like relations.    
 
 
People who have lived in different cultures or have different, significant cultural influences in their lives 
almost unanimously attest to this fact: not everybody perceives the world in the same way. Perceiving the 
world in different ways is surely not only a cultural phenomenon, since biological particularities and 
pragmatic interests, among others, also play a role. Some questions arise in this context: Are these differences 
errors, or are they compatible manifestations of  the same world? Are these differences a matter of  inferences, 
or are they perceptual (understanding perception in a direct, immediate way)? Is perception mostly a function 
of  individual biological capacities, or does it involve elements from everyday and social life? In this article, I 
am concerned with the last of  those questions. Long-standing assumptions in the philosophy of  mind have 
treated interpersonal perceptual differences as errors, and have dismissed social aspects from perception.  
Call perceptual situations that show differences between members of  different social groups, and 
agreement between members of  the same group, socially dependent perception, or SDP.1 SDP has often been 
treated as caused by linguistic or otherwise conceptual components of  cognition. For ilustrative purposes, 
let’s take the seemingly simple case of  the Müller-Lyer lines’ (so-called) illusion. This case is commonly 
brought up when the theorist wants to argue for the point that perception alone isn’t reliable, that perception 
is a matter of  seemings—un upshot of  the idea of  the modularity of  perception and its alleged cognitive 
impenetrability (Adams & Kveraga, 2015; Brogaard, 2016, pp. 85–86).  
Despite its allegedly being a case of  universal perceptual deception, research in social cognition has 
shown that not everybody is susceptible, or susceptible to the same degree, to the illusion that one line is 
                              
1 Examples of social groups can be generational groups, national cultures, and subcultures, among others. I operate with 
a broad, intuitive idea that there is an intersubjective formation wherever a group acts in a some relatively constant 
manner. My argument does not require a set of criteria for social formations. 
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larger than the other. In some societies  —particularly  the South African gold miners, the San people in the 
Kalahari desert— "most people were virtually immune to the illusion" (McCauley and Heinrich, 2006, 79).  
Strange as it might sound, the Müller-Lyer lines help establish that SDP are the case. The Müller-Lyer 
lines don’t uncover secrets about the ontological and epistemological nature of  perception. They are no 
proof  of  a supposed fundamental unreliability of  perception. They rather show, when taking into account 
how they appear to people from different backgrounds, that even in basic cases there are differences in the 
way we perceive, which are arguably due to culture. And this constitutes good reason to deny the claim that 
no perception is socially influenced. In other words, it is clear that there are cases of  SDP.2 Take this as an 
initial diagnosis, which I will further subtantiate in section 2, making clear too why SDP is a fundamental 
desideratum of  a theory of  perception, and allow me, in the meantime, to lay out my argument.  
Far from being uncommon, akin to the situation with the Müller-Lyer figure, SDP cases (featuring 
perceptual intra-group agreement and inter-group disagreement) are relatively easy to find and establish (see 
section 2). Examination of  SDP has already been taking place in other disciplines like social cognition, 
cognitive anthropology, and cultural psychology, sometimes with a perceptual bent. In philosophy, 
externalist, contextualist, and pragmatist approaches to knowledge, meaning, and content already offer 
resources to tackle some of  the problems involved. But specifically in perception, the examination of  social 
aspects has received much less attention. This article aims at contributing to correct that vast overlook.  
I hold that enactive views best deliver the anti-Cartesian, non-intellectualistic, contextualist promise of  
situated cognition approaches, particularly in perception. In my view, the notion that perceiving is partly 
constituted by something we do in interaction with the world involves and is epistemologically prior to 
embodied-centered, embedded-centered, and extended-centered views. But here I will not argue for either the 
primacy of  enactivism or the particular understanding of  the overall composition of  enactivism and the 
other three 3 Es.   
My attempt here is to argue that enactivism has the tools to account for SDP and to offer a central piece 
of  the version of  enactivism that can handle SDP. This is a social enactivism about perception (SEP). Within 
enactive views, social enactivism’s ability to handle SDP makes it a better enactivism that the other ones 
available.   
I propose to correct the enactivist conception of  perception by putting the notion of  perceptual practices 
at the center of  a social enactive account. Perceptual practices are a Wittgenstein-inspired notion that 
situates the baseline of  perception at the level of  intersubjectively constituted, sensory-based practices of  
interaction with worldly objects. Perceptual practices show that perception does not fully resolve in lawlike 
sensorimotor dependencies and the skillful knowledge of  them. In my concluding remarks, I will sketch one 
way in which sensorimotor dependencies have a place within perceptual practices and within a fuller enactive 
account of  perception.  
It has been argued by a number of  enactive-inclined philosophers that Wittgenstein is a forerunner of  
enactive approaches to cognition (Hurley, 1998; Hutto, 2013, 2013; Hutto & Myin, 2013; Medina, 2003, 2004, 
                              
2 It is not my task here to interpret this case in the light of social enactivism, but to reject the universality claim and 
establish SDP, even in simple cases. On the positive side, it is worth noting two elements that will play out in a social 
enactive interpretation. First, it is the fact that the experience of the lines is so plainly perceptual that it is hard to 
imagine what linguistic or conceptual frameworks could help understand. After all, it is safe to assume that the concepts 
"line," "length," "longer than," and "shorter than" are correctly applied in the different groups in regular cases. Second, 
the findings of the work of Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits (1966) suggest that the differences in visual perception 
with the Müller-Lyer lines are due to “culturally influenced differences in visual experience during the first two decades 
of life” (McCauley & Henrich, 2006, p. 79). For Westerners, think in particular of the exposure to boxy environments, 
such as square rooms. Additional to this, the lab-like nature of these lines, which are assessed in conditions unlike the 
active conditions in which they are typically encountered, would be a factor into the way the lines are perceived. At any 
rate, I am not concerned now with an explanation of the concrete differences.  
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2012; Noë, 2013, 2015). In Hurley’s view, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a precursor of  enactivism because he 
debunks the idea that there are intermediaries between mind and world that are necessary (or even useful) for 
our understanding of  cognitive and perceptual abilities (1998, pp. 221–244). On a similar point, even analytic 
pragmatists like Putnam (1999) see Wittgenstein’s work as an antidote against mainstream views in 
philosophy of  mind, a task enactivism shares. Hutto argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy not only contains 
the basics of  enactivism, but that it also provides the resources to embrace a true enactivism, free of  the risks 
of  falling into representational modes of  thinking. Medina argues that the enactivist idea is already sketched 
in Wittgenstein’s later writings, in terms of  an embodied interactive exploration of  the world (2012, p. 3ff.). 
Wittgenstein’s rich notion of  social practices, as Medina has remarked, has the elements to turn 
enactivism about perception into social enactivism about perception. A correct analysis of  action shows that 
human perception cannot be understood outside social practices, akin to language-games and forms of  life 
(Williams, 1999).  
Building upon Wittgenstein’s practices, I argue for perceptual practices: the enactment of  
intersubjectively constituted and regulated (finely attuned) techniques of  commerce of—production of  and 
response to—meaningful (multimodal) perceptible material. In their configuration, they exhibit contextual, 
performative, expressive, and normative dimensions. Sensorimotor dependencies, where applicable, are fully 
incorporated within the framework. Culturally-informed sensory-based everyday activities, such as cooking-
eating, dress, decoration, music, the use of  intonation and musicality in speech, are paradigmatic instances of  
perceptual practices.  
Section 1 evaluates how the existing enactivisms, and specifically how sensorimotor enactivism, fare in 
relation to SDP. Section 2 offers three significant cases of  socially dependent perception, SDP, showing that 
SDP is a type of  phenomenon that can’t be explained away non-peceptually. On this basis, I round up the 
case that sensorimotor enactivism is inadequate to deal with SDP. In section 3, I offer a Wittgensteinian 
analysis of  action as social practices. In section 4, I zone in on perceptual practices as a special kind of  social 
practices, and I sketch its main elements: the enactment of  culturally structured, normatively rich techniques 
of  commerce of  meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. This section presents the enactivist 
credentials of  perceptual. In section 5, I offer an analysis of  three structural features of  perception which 
appear in socially dependent perception and are accounted for satisfactorily by perceptual practices, namely: 
attentional focus, aspects’ saliency, and modal-specific harmony-like relations. I revisit the cases of  section 2 
with the new tools in hand.   
 
1. Noë’s Sensorimotor Enactivism and Other Existing Enactivisms  
A good place to start is to see how existing enactivisms fare concerning SDP.  
    Let’s take first autopoietic enactivism (Thompson, 2007; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). This 
variety of  enactivism can’t satisfactorily explain SDP because, first, it does not readily have a notion of  
intersubjectivity. By keeping the business of  cognition entirely individual, its sociality is akin to an inter-
monadology (Thompson, 2007, p. 382ff.). Second, autopoietic enactivism declares itself  open to SDP-like 
situations but leaves it as a task to be realized, amounting then no more than handwaving (2007, pp. 402–
411). Autopoietic enactivism does not satisfactorily explain SDP.  This inability may be due to the tasks their 
authors set out to tackle. I believe that in the first stages of  enactivism, a type of  individual-only 
groundwork was necessary and that Thompson’s more recent work has a different target in mind, namely, to 
situate itself  more in relation to the domain of  life than to the social domain. But when we come to analyze 
human cognition —human perception— we’d be remiss to shrug off  the social as secondary.   
Hutto and Myin’s Radical Enactive Cognition (REC) does not fare well either. To begin, there is hardly a 
mention of  society in the REC work. Despite its claims of  radicality, REC’s minimal minds outsource SDP 
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and cognitive phenomena of  social origin to "contentful and representationally based modes of  thinking," 
which "should be regarded as emerging late in the phylogeny and ontogeny, being dependent on immersion 
in special sorts of  shared practices" (Hutto & Myin, 2013, p. 13). Even by Hutto and Myin’s standards, this 
concession amounts to put SDP in the domain of  cognition beyond perception. I am not convinced by their 
arguments that sociality-involving perception is rather cognitive, in an inferential sort of  way. 
Hutto and Myin double down on these claims In their most recent Evolving Enactivism (Hutto & Myin, 
2017). There, REC gives up on the contentless framework when facing SDP (Hutto & Myin, 2017, pp. 171–
176). For one, their division of  contentless, basic perceiving on the one hand, and contentful perceiving on 
the other puts the bulk of  perception back in the representationalism camp. That division replicates the 
disputable distinction between low-level properties (LLP) as the only strictly perceptual properties, and high-
level properties (HLP) as perceptual cum inferential. 
This contradiction is not only entailed by other REC’s commitments. REC explicitly drops the ball in a 
crucial point: it argues that basic HLPs, consequently SDPs, are thought, not perceived. Speaking of  
perceiving a dog out a of  picture of  black dots, REC says that "for those who have also mastered the relevant 
sociocultural practices, they will not only effortlessly and irresistibly see a dog, they will be tempted, 
irresistibly, to judge ‘It's a dog’—to have a thought with some such predicates and truth conditional content" 
(Hutto & Myin, 2017, pp. 172–174). Evolving Enactivism effectively renounces an account of  SDP on 
perceptual grounds, which, fatal for its purposes, gives away most of  perception to representationalism, since 
most perception involves high-level properties, which are accounted for by REC through contents and 
representations. In conclusion, REC does not satisfactorily explain SDP.  
Let’s then look at sensorimotor enactivism, possibly the best known of  them all (Noë, O'Regan, and 
Hurley). This type will be the focus of  this article, not only because it remains the most attractive and best 
known of  them, but also because it is the enactive account that provides the most hands-on detail about our 
interaction with the world, particularly in perception. In this introductory section, I begin to build my case 
against sensorimotor enactivism.   
Can sensorimotor enactivism satisfactorily explain SDP? I intend to show that it can’t because SDP 
cannot be accounted for by lawlike sensorimotor dependencies, the centerpiece notion of  that theory.  
Here’s a quick case to start off. Think of  adding salt to food. There is nothing sensorimotor in the 
common phenomenon by which some dishes taste better, or in which some flavors are more noticeable after 
salt is added to food. Alternatively, think of  the evident seeing-as nature of  the duck-rabbit case and the 
aspect-changes for the one who can shift between a duck and a rabbit.  
The key aspect of  Noë's sensorimotor enactivism, and the one on which I built my criticism is the 
reductive nature of  perception to the sensorimotor, and the spatial and objective understanding of  
sensorimotor.   
Noë says: “In perception, your relation to 
 the perceived features is sensorimotor” (2012, p. 57). And the perceptual sensorimotor account is 
exclusively spatial: “Perception is the encounter with the world from a point of  view,” where our knowledge 
of  the way things change “as we move or would move in relation” to them, is what allows us to perceive 
(Noë, 2012, p. 58). The “way things change” depending on our movement are the sensorimotor dependencies. 
For the sensorimotor enactivist, our perception of  things is constituted by a type of  action and 
dependent upon the things themselves and by lawlike sensorimotor dependencies. They are lawlike because 
they are objective, in the sense that they are constituted by positions in the world from where a certain 
perspective obtains—relations between objects and their environments (Noë, 2004, 2012; O’Regan & Noë, 
2001). In Noë’s view, perspectival properties (P-properties) “are real (or objective) in the sense that they do 
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not depend, for their nature, either on what goes on in us (e.g., sensations) or on what we do. P-properties are 
properties of  the environment” (Noë, 2004, p. 84).  
The importance of  spatiality and the idea that perspectival properties obtain objectively for equally 
situated spectators are correct, but not without qualifications and only as a partial account of  perception. Spatiality, 
for example, is critical for vision, but not for taste. It is wrong to think that perception is only a sensorimotor 
affair, partly because perception isn’t just spatial. Also, since there are more than objectively obtaining 
perspectival encounters with objects, the sensorimotor account is also mistaken because p-properties are not 
the only perceptual properties and not every perception involves p-properties—p-properties are neither 
sufficient nor necessary.  
Some of  the properties we encounter in perception are not only of  the environment but depend on 
specific perceiver-environment interactions that are rich in various ways. Our ways of  perceiving the world 
are largely socially constituted. They include not only the perspectival relationship with objects, but also 
attention-related phenomena, the usual enacting of  intensities (in all senses except vision), and the sensory-
specific properties that depend on specific grouping or sequences (complementary flavors, harmonious 
sounds, etc.). This last group I will refer to as harmony-like relations. They are a type of  harmony in the 
quite broad sense of  things that go well together.  
Let me take a step back. Am I straw-manning Noë’s position? I am uncharitably making his account of  
perception reductive when it is not? 
Noe’s position has changed over the years. His fuller epistemological account has embraced more openly 
something additional to the sensorimotor aspect. This other aspect he has referred to as “skill and 
understanding,” or as knowledge “sensorimotor and otherwise” ((Noë, 2013, pp. 184–186; emphasis added) or 
more recently as an account of  “understanding concepts in the perceptual mode” (Noë, 2015, p. 3). What 
does this mean for this sensorimotor account of  perception and my criticism of  it? 
Either perception is enactive in a sensorimotor way, or it is sensorimotor plus something else. If  it is 
enactive in a sensorimotor way, then my criticism holds as sketched. But if  it is sensorimotor plus something 
else, then we need to know what that something else and how it operates, concretely, in perception.  
First, Noë still identifies the perceptual with the sensorimotor. I have already quoted Noë in this respect, 
but it is illustrative to quote him in length now: 
Actionism [another name Noë uses for enactivism] is the thesis that perception is the activity of  
exploring the environment making use of  knowledge of  sensorimotor contingencies. Sensorimotor 
contingencies are understood to be patterns of  dependence of  sensory change on movement. The 
proposal, then, is that we make use of  this knowledge of  the way our own movement gives rise to 
sensory change to explore the world. This knowledge-based or skillful activity is perceiving. (Noë, 2015, 
p. 1; emphasis added) 
The sensorimotor enactive account of  perception is only sensorimotor, no doubt. My criticism holds.  
Is there anything to the alternative where something else is added to the sensorimotor?  
Noë’s account of  concepts, the intellect, and understanding partakes in an enactive spirit. He argues that 
two modes of  the understanding (perceptual and practical understanding) are specifically action-based 
(2015). We see the enactive spirit too, for instance, in his privileging concepts of  achievement or success, 
such as access, over traditional, representational ones (2012, 2013, 2015). As Noë puts it, “we achieve the 
world by enacting ourselves” (2012, pp. 12–13).  
However, when it comes to perception, Noë’s broader proposal is vague. Noë says: “All perceptual 
experience is a matter of  bringing the world into focus by achieving the right kind of  skillful access to it, the 
right kind of  understanding” (Noë, 2013, p. 188). And here’s the ambiguity: either the skills used in 
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perception, and the understanding achieved, are sensorimotor (as the quotation above explicitly state), or 
they allow for different kinds—where the right kinds can encompass more than the sensorimotor.  
The problem is that if  the perception is sensorimotor plus something else, it is not clear about what that 
something else is, and how that something else 1) is still perceptual; and, if  perceptual, 2) how it is enactive. 
What are these non-sensorimotor, perceptual skills? Making perceptual experience broader than the 
sensorimotor, without providing details, is little more than handwaving because we don’t need vague 
pointings, but explanations. We need to know how our perceiving the world is a matter of  our doings, 
including (and this is fundamental, I argue) how our perceiving the world is influenced by society.  
Does Noë’s fuller enactivism overcome the obstacles of  sensorimotor enactivism in becoming a richer 
account of  perception and in accounting for SDP? It does not. Since the something else route lacks much-
needed detail, my criticism of  the insufficiency of  the sensorimotor holds (either because it is reductive, or 
because it is vague), and my positive proposal for perceptual practices stands and appears as a much-needed 
addition to an enactive account of  perception. 
In sum, Noë’s recent intellectual trajectory has privileged securing a broader epistemological foothold: 
the understanding tout court. That is a worthy theoretical commitment, but it is one that comes at the cost of  
not fleshing out specifics. Noë’s enactivism and his fuller epistemological account are no doubt compatible 
with the social enactive perception I defend. There is much to commend about that overall epistemological 
picture, but it’s a bird’s eye view. It’s been one of  the virtues of  situated cognition efforts, and of  enactivisim 
in particular, to flesh out how cognition, and perception, in particular, work. That commitment to detail must 
remain for enactivism to continue to be one of  the players in the literature. For this reason, too, my account 
should be welcome.  
The perceptual is more than sensorimotor, and our best epistemology needs a perception that is more 
than sensorimotor, and that is rich in details. We need to know in what specific ways our perceiving the 
world, including our socially influenced perception of  the world, is constituted by our doings. A social 
enactive account of  perception, based on the notion of  perceptual practices, offers the type of  action-based 
detailed responses that it is enactivism’s task to deliver.  
 
2. Socially Dependent Perception (SDP) is a desideratum of  a theory of  perception 
In the previous section, I presented evidence that the Müller-Lyer lines do not always yield an illusion and 
that they rather show that some perceptual experiences are bona fide socially dependent perceptions, or SDPs. 
In this section, I offer a few more types of  perceptual occurrences that show that SDPs are the case, and are 
all-too-common and all-too-signficant in perception to go unaccounted for. On this basis, I go on to round up 
my case as to the insufficiency of  sensorimotor enactivism. 
The three SDP cases I offer here illustrate that the differences between different perceptions of  the same 
object or state of  affairs,  
(1) are social because they reflect intra-group agreement and inter-group disagreement,  
(2) can’t be explained away by a supposed contrast between veridical and non-veridical perceptions, and  
(3) aren’t merely a matter of  conceptual, largely linguistic, differences between persons from different 
cultural backgrounds.  
I conclude by showing that  
(4) sensorimotor enactivism is inadequate to deal with this type of  perceptual occurrences.   
This inability of  sensorimotor enactivism to deal with SDP, as fundamental in human perception,  calls 
for enactivism to articulate a better concept of  action (sections 3 and 4).    
Wholes, parts, and eye movements. Differences between the way some US Americans visually perceive 
and the way some East Asians do have been found. Measurements of  eye movements when confronted with a 
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visual scene in which focal objects and background can be distinguished yield differential results. “Americans 
fixated more on focal objects than did the Chinese, and the Americans tended to look at the focal object more 
quickly. In addition, the Chinese made more saccades to the background than did the Americans” (Chua, 
Boland, & Nisbett, 2005, p. 12629). Another study by Masuda and Nisbett (2001) presented US American 
and Japanese subjects with a drawing of  an aquarium, which included focal objects (mainly fish) and 
background objects (a section of  ground and water bubbles). As reported by Winerman, “Americans were 
more likely to begin by recalling the focal fish, while Japanese were more likely to describe the whole scene, 
saying something like "it was a lake or pond." Later, the Japanese participants also recalled more details 
about the background objects than the Americans did” (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Winerman, 2006). What 
these scientific studies show is that basic aspects of  visual experience can be culturally constituted, and can’t 
hence be assumed to be universal: “eye movements can differ as a function of  culture” (Chua et al., 2005, p. 
12631).3 They also show that the content of  perception is not simply a mirroring of  external states of  
affairs but a take on them.4  
This case features both intra-group agreement and inter-group disagreement due to an intersubjective 
factor, which in this case is cultural, national belonging. But it is important to notice that this is not due to a 
veridical-non-veridical difference, for the different groups are presented with the same situation, and the 
differences are not matter-of-factly. It is, in fact, undecidable whether it is the parts or it is the whole that is 
prior, both ontologically and epistemologically: there is no fact of  the matter. The specificity of  the 
experience can’t be pinned down then to the way the world is, since the way the world gives rise to different 
experiences, none of  which is incorrect. It’s got to reside, then, at the level of  aboutness—that which the 
experience is about—which is not only a matter of  worldly reference. Further, it is important to notice that 
the difference in both groups of  experiences is not only sub-personal (eye saccades), but is personal and 
available for introspective analysis, verbal reporting, inferentially (downstream), and in plain behavior.  
Aboutness is likely to be partly determined here by attentional factors. I doubt that that covers it. 
Ontological decisions along Quinean lines —about what exists (or doesn’t) and can (or can’t) be object of  
attention— are at stake as well. While Quine makes the point that these determinations are to an extent a 
matter of  syntax and semantics, the present case shows that context-dependence and context-independence 
work in non-linguistic perceptual ways, and showing intra-group agreement and inter-group disagreement. 
But my goal here is not to account for this experience, but to establish that it is a bona fide case of  socially 
dependent perception (SDP). That much has been established.   
Taste, rituals, and habits. In a recent study, Rituals Enhance Consumption, researchers found that 
participants that engaged in ‘ritualized behavior’ regarding consumption of  chocolate, experienced chocolate 
much more positively than those that didn’t engage in such behavior (Vohs, Wang, Gino, & Norton, 2013, p. 
1714). Researchers highlight that ritualized behavior increases engagement in the action, hence causing a 
heightened and more pleasant perceptual experience.5  
Some may argue that the difference here is not perceptual but emotional. However, the experience in the 
chemical senses, smell and taste, as well as the multisensory experience of  flavor include as intrinsic to them 
                              
3 For an extended analysis and link with Müller-Lyer lines see (McCauley & Henrich, 2006). See also Arango (2014). 
4 Well-known change-blindness cases well illustrate that perception is not about the passive receiving of the way the 
world is, but is rather a take on the way the world is—in this case about relevance and importance. For a succinct review 
of studies in this topic see (Norenzayan, Choi, & Peng, 2007, pp. 578–579). 
5 While there are reasons to link the pragmatic dependence of perception on research with the broader cognitive 
penetrability of perception, nothing in my argument hinges on it. For some, cognitive penetrability of perception refers to 
the possibility of things at the level of thought to affect what we perceive. It is also possible to take a broader view of 
cognitive penetrability, allowing no only thoughts but also other cognitive, extra-perceptual, non-epistemic aspects of 
the actions. For a related discussion see (Deroy, 2012). 
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the phenomenon known as hedonics. So since the perceptual includes the emotional in these cases, the 
differences are still perceptual. Smells or flavors are perceptually experienced not only as sensory qualities 
(bitter, sweet) but in terms of  an affect that accompanies them, a liking or disliking (Bartoshuk, 1991; 
Stevenson, 2009, pp. 159–161). Previous theories of  hedonics tried to place the ‘liking’ factor in the object 
itself—in the case of  food, in its orosensory properties. Further studies show that a full explanation of  the 
phenomenon needs to invoke a “dynamic interaction” between properties of  the food (its sensible properties 
and its nutritional ones) and attributes (historical and contextual) of  the perceiver (Sclafani, 1991, p. 60).  
Ritualized behaviors often have a social origin: ways and times of  enjoying, for example, hot chocolate or 
tea. But often too, ritualization gives rise to habituation, which prevails even if  the immediate ritual is not 
present. The case of  cilantro is a good example. A recent study by Mauer and El-Sohemy shows differential 
disliking of  cilantro among different groups: "The proportion of  subjects classified as disliking cilantro was 
21% for East Asians, 17% for Caucasians, 14% for those of  African descent, 7% for South Asians, 4% for 
Hispanics, and 3% for Middle Eastern subjects" (Mauer & El-Sohemy, 2012). It is well established that socio-
cultural and environmental factors play a role in food liking and disliking. One reason is that familiarity with 
some flavors is a consequence of  cultural habits (Axelson, 1986; Mauer & El-Sohemy, 2012; Sclafani, 1991). 
While a genetic component that influences some people's detection of  a soapy taste in cilantro has been 
identified, there seems to be agreement that this genetic variation can be overcome. One possible reason is 
that this genetic variants, specifically bitter receptors and "a signaling component for taste, common to both 
sweet and bitter perception"  (Knaapila et al., 2012), do not correlate quite univocally with personal 
preferences. It seems likely too that the group variation is reinforced in fact by the sheer exposition to the 
herb in emotionally positive contexts like family, or by the creation of  new patterns (Eriksson et al., 2012; 
McGee, n.d.). This is consistent with other studies that agree on low heritability for the perceptual responses 
associated with cilantro (Eriksson et al., 2012; Knaapila et al., 2012). Interestingly, different ways of  cooking 
with cilantro --arguably more diverse where the presence of  the herb is more common-- allow for a different 
final release of  specific odor- and smell-units, influencing the prevalence of  the soapy ones, hence of  the 
dislike. One such case is crushing cilantro leaves, which releases enzymes "gradually convert the aldehydes 
into other substances with no aroma" (McGee, n.d.).  
These cases present us again with subjects with socially originated habits, having different experiences 
of  the same state of  affairs in virtue of  an extra-sensory, but not extra-perceptual, element. If  these 
experiences were to be judged by an external state of  affairs, the experiences would, or at least should, be the 
same across different people. In the case of  ritualized consumption, there is no reason to judge one level of  
satisfaction more correct than the other. The case of  habit-based preferences is somewhat different. If  the 
perception were entirely triggered by a biological determination, I would need to call into question the 
sameness of  the perceiver, rendering idle the claim that it’s not an issue of  (non)veridicality. But a case like 
cilantro’s, where genetic factors can be overcome by sociocultural/environmental factors and the hedonics 
then associated with consumption, leaves the relevant perceptual element at the level of  a possible take on a 
perceptible occurrence: some people perceive cilantro as a likable herb, and some perceive it as an unlikable 
herb, and it’s not because some get a soapy taste, since some who like it also may also feel the soapy aspect. 
Perception linked to neither ritualized nor merely habitual consumption, as described, seems to be a 
matter of  having certain concepts or having certain words, such that heightened enjoyment of  foods or the 
positive or negative hedonics depends on having them. The person who comes to like cilantro after not liking 
it, probably explores new flavor combinations or learns ways of  eating it, but this is hardly the acquisition of  
a concept. What concept would that be? In fact, very much along the lines of  skillful knowledge, what the 
subject may learn is ways of  combining things or of  exploring food perceptually (i.e., in more detail, like in 
the case of  ritualized consumption). It might be argued that, in some cases, the person learns a new 
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experience and words associated with them, as in the case of  a sommelier learning that some wines have 
“more body,” are “earthier,” or what-have-you. I understand that a conceptual interpretation is available for 
such cases. I don’t have the space to dispute it here, but I propose that the case is interpreted non-
conceptually. In such an interpretation, the phenomenal aspect is experienced first than words and concepts 
are learned and words, and concepts hook onto the phenomenal aspect. Further, the type of  operations that 
learning a new flavor allows are flavor-like, in a broad enactive way: to know a flavor is to know, for instance, 
what it goes well with. Ritualized and habitual flavor experiences are often SDPs, and they can’t be resolved 
in concepts or words—one more phenomenon that needs enactive explanation.       
Flavor sequences and combinations. It is a common and intuitively clear phenomenon that flavors are 
sensitive to the flavor of  what is consumed right before, or with. Flavor combinations, sequential and non-
sequential, underlie the complex practice of  cooking and eating.  
Think of  drinking a sweetened coffee after having eaten something very sweet —say a spoonful of  
arequipe. We have one state of  affairs, namely, sweetened coffee, tasting differently to different subjects, or to 
the same subject at different times, depending on whether they ate something very sweet right before. As to 
not strictly sequential combinations, Colombian cusisine has also a good number of  examples: ajiaco would 
not be ajiaco without guascas, empanadas taste good with some lime or ají, the flavor and texture of  bananas 
seems to go well with many a soup, and the suero costeño, some Colombians say, can be added to a number 
of  things enhancing their flavor.  
These cases rely on habitual sequences or combinations, which are sometimes varied purposefully—some 
pass on the cappers in their ajiaco. More often than not, habitual sequences are firmly established and we are 
unaware of  the way our regular combinations affect the flavor of  things—because this is the way we do 
things. They are established by means of  their social nature, which is the participation in practices for those 
immersed in a culture. The next section will explore perceptual practices in length.  
What these cases show is the contextual (and non-sensorimotor) dependence of  flavor. Sequences of  
flavors matter for flavor experiences, making it impossible to pick one external state of  affairs, say, the 
chemical composition of  something edible, that individuates, in isolation, the experience of  its flavor. It’s not 
just about the relevant aspects of  coffee’s chemical composition.  
I now want to take these three cases SDP cases and show that sensorimotor enactivism is inadequate to 
account for them.  
In Noë’s sensorimotor enactivism, we have seen, perception depends exclusively on lawlike, objective 
sensorimotor relations. P-properties exist independently of  us but are enacted when we, in virtue of  our 
movements, occupy a certain position. To put it visually, this means that any pair of  eyes, having a certain 
line of  sight over a given object, would have the same perspective in virtue of  the geometric configuration 
of  the scene, which determines the perceptual differences between different actors.  
As I discussed in the previous section, there is more than p-properties in perception and not all 
perceptions feature p-properties. P-properties are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for perception. 
The three cases just presented show precisely that this is the case. Noë’s sensorimotor enactivism can’t help 
us account for these cases because the motor aspect, if  present, is not what defines the actions that lead to 
specific perceptions.   
In the wholes and parts case, to be the type of  perceiver that perceives a more holistic or a more 
atomistic scene is not a matter of  moving in certain ways because the entire scene is available for both types 
of  observers: no set of  perspectives, geometrically defined, is different between one group and the other, so 
the differences in experiences can’t be pinned down on p-properties.  In other words, both types of  observers 
have a sensory interaction with the entire scene, and the motor element in the saccades do not constitute in 
this case the occupying of  a position one group occupies and the other doesn’t. They rather show increased 
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attention over some areas of  the scene. Section 4 will explain in what way attention is a feature of  perceptual 
practices.  
The second case (taste, rituals, and habits), featuring how rituals alter the way people experience food 
they consume does not seem to attain any clarity by appealing to sensorimotor enactivism. The differences 
that manifest in the greater liking of  a given food, such that it’s experienced differently from someone who 
does not like it, have nothing to do with performing some movement such that the sensory aspect changes. 
Being a participant in the ritual makes one used to an experience, opening the door to the more nuanced 
enjoyment that the one in-the-know is able to find and explore. The person participating in the ritual is able 
to employ attentional resources more pointedly, focusing on salient aspects that may simply go unnoticed for 
the non-participant. The salience of  aspects and increased attention will be further explored in section 4.  
In opposition to the commitment to the objective nature of  key perceptual properties, this case features 
an evident subjective component. But what we have there is that for the senses that include a hedonic 
component, there can be no true individuation of  things perceived on the object side alone. This does not 
mean that the issue is only subjective. It is also intersubjective, for we often find in these cases social 
agreement, which brings a normative measure to the table. 
In the flavor sequences and combinations case, these are obtained in virtue of  material mixes. Evidently, 
the motor aspect is irrelevant, for it is not the movement of  the hand shaking a salt shaker that causes the 
change in flavor, because salt could be added in other ways. The relevant action is the adding or mixing itself  
of  ingredients, which is the picking of  some edible materials and their use in particular food-based 
circumstances. Harmony-like relations are brought about by doings—the active choosing and putting 
together of  elements that are not necessarily to be linked together.  
Despite its attractiveness, then, Noë’s account of  perception does not go far enough. It is insufficient for 
the rich content of  our experiences to be individuated merely by appeal to spatial only laws and only 
sensorimotor laws.  
In order to attain a better notion of  action that equips enactivism with the tools to handle with SDPs, 
two initial elements need to be at work: non-spatial dependencies, an interactional element, and a notion 
sensitive to our social nature expressed in pragmatics, that is, in the things we do. Were we not the socially 
shaped beings that we are —having acquired the forms of  perceptual exploration we have and being familiar 
with specific sense-scapes in different sensory modalities, in virtue of  having been part of  the communities 
we have partaken in—, we would not experience the world as we do. I now turn to Wittgenstein’s notion of  
practices to look for resources.  
 
3. Finding Bedrock in Practices 
The philosophical justification for the thematic and methodological primacy of  action can be grasped in 
comparison with the Kantian orientation. For Kant, concepts only take place when they are used in 
judgments, but never in isolation. Kant arguably endorses a holistic perspective: judgments (not concepts) are 
in the first order of  business (that’s why intuitions always need concepts and vice versa) but the philosophical 
work is to be done in the transcendental field of  concepts. Although our concepts play an important role in 
our use of  language, I follow Wittgenstein when he argues that concepts are subservient to the structure of  
our practices as actual interrelated wholes. This investigation on our practices (linguistic and perceptual) 
aims at showing not “the rules that govern our use of  words” (or our perception) but the “distinctive 
patterns” of  language (or of  perception) in our practices: what we use, the way we use it, the ‘norms’ we 
follow, etc. (Williams, 1999, p. 189). This way of  doing philosophy aims at showing the practice itself. In 
contrast with the idea that the philosophical work is not about our practices, but about the conditions or 
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causes for them, Wittgenstein thinks that the philosophical work can be done, and must be done at the 
practice level. 
To think of  a domain of  philosophical reflection from a pragmatic point of  view means to see that its 
“ultimate global justification” is found “in terms of  its usefulness to people” (Lance & O’Leary-Hawthorne, 
1997, p. 135). ‘What is useful to people’ does not refer to a set standard of  usefulness (utility or expediency) 
but should be understood as that which accords to the explicit or implicit goals internal to what people do, 
even when the goal is the inertial continuation of  the way we do things. ‘What people do’ is what 
Wittgenstein calls a “consensus of  action” (Medina, 2002, p. 150), and such consensus is the basis for 
intelligibility and normativity, although not merely on account of  being a consensus. For Lance and O’Leary-
Hawthorne, a social practice—what people do—is “the basic vehicle of  understanding” (1997, p. 133) and is 
the structure of  “social appropriatenesses” (1997, p. 184), that is, the space where actions and reactions are 
subject to normative assessment. Normative assessment is also present in cases of  mere conformity to the 
allowed ways of  doing things. Further, they argue that “we must interpret the community in terms of  its 
practices” and the point to take from here is that there is no interpreting device for a specific community 
more basic than what the community does (Lance & O’Leary-Hawthorne, 1997, p. 184). 
The consensus of  action on which practices consists is not only the de facto agreement in behaviors and 
attitudes, that is, in actions, reactions, and dispositions, but a style of  doing things that is the product of  
processes of  acculturation and training. The normative force of  social practices lies not in the number of  
practitioners but in its continued existence through time in a community, where skilled practitioners train 
others into practices, by getting them to act according to patterns of  behaviors and within domains of  
moves allowed. Training does not occur in an abstract space, however. It takes place against a background 
that includes a constant environment, i.e. a stable, physically defined environment, and a certain natural set 
of  dispositions and reactions—which Wittgenstein called “natural reactions”— that can nevertheless be 
shaped and developed (Medina 2002, 162; see also 136, 171).  
In relation to training, Lance and O’Leary-Hawthorne have said that “talk about meaning is concerned 
with language-learning moves, but tacitly presupposes that appropriate recognitional capacities and 
dispositions to non-linguistic behavior are already in place” (1997, 137; Medina 2002, 162). The extension of  
a practice-based view to the perceptual domain will partly deal with those capacities and dispositions to non-
linguistic behavior. These capacities and dispositions will be addressed not only in the sense that they are 
prior to linguistic learning, but also insofar as they are constantly present in a person’s life, not simply 
subordinate to, but coexistent with, language and other cognitive activities. 
The normative dimension of  practices, issuing from the processes of  acculturation by which novices are 
brought into such practices, configures a “space of  attribution of  commitments to practitioners of  the 
practice,” that is, a space where expectations about actions, reactions, dispositions, attitudes, and other moves 
are in place, and are the basis for judgments about behavior and attitudes of  self  and others (judgments that 
may not even arise when things are done according to the established social practice) (Lance and O’Leary-
Hawthorne 1997, 174–175).  
Social practices are characterized by contextuality, performativity, expressivity, and normativity.6 
Practices are contextual in that determination of  meanings, truth, and other normative aspects is only 
decidable by the whole concrete practices that happen over against specific social circumstances, including a 
physical environment. Practices are performative because they consist of  actions, reactions and dispositions. 
Practices are expressive because they express the form of  life of  a community. Communities, in this 
perspective, are not aggregations of  individuals but active groups structured by patterns of  behavior 
                              
6 Medina has argued for the triplet contextuality, performativity, and normativity (2003, 62ff.). To that group, I add 
expressivity. 
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(Medina 2002, 170). Lastly, practices are normative because they feature a dimension of  correctness and 
intelligibility—of  successfulness and pragmatic meaningfulness—that is exhibited in the practices 
themselves and is grounded in the processes of  training by which new practitioners are brought into the 
community and by which the community continuously develops and transforms itself. Wittgenstein’s view 
on practices is holistic: these four features are highly interwoven, and each of  them will appear in one way or 
another in the account of  the other three. For example, there is no talking of  contextuality that is not at the 
same time performative, since the context is first and foremost found in a normatively structured consensus 
of  ways of  doing things that expresses the forms of  life if  the communities that practice them.  
 
4. Perceptual Practices 
In this section, I flesh out in greater detail what perceptual practices —a special kind of  social practices— 
are. Perceptual practices are the enactment of  culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of  
interaction with multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. Perception is woven in a type of  social practices 
that includes, for instance, food, dance, dress, music, etc.  
We learn about our perceptual practices by reflection on the changes that can take place while looking at 
something, by considering the conditions in which perception actually happens, by comparing our way of  
talking about perception with other ways of  referring to it (in opposition with the paradigm based on 
‘sensory information’ and the inner/outer separation), or by a looking at structural characteristics of  
perceptual experience, such as its immediacy. Importantly, our practices can be investigated by seeing our 
attitudes or responses to perceptual occurrences.  
This richness evinces, among other things, a central characteristic of  perceptual practices: they are 
twofold, both experience and behavior (a dual-aspect character that permeates the whole of  my dissertation 
because of  its dual phenomenological-pragmatic influences). I have argued that practices have contextual, 
performative, expressive and normative components. In light of  my goal in this article, I’d pay special 
attention to performativity as a central aspect of  perceptual practices.  
One of  the central insights of  Wittgenstein about perception is that perception is always perceiving-
aspects—yields a substantive set of  claims: that in perception we always perceive things aspectually, that 
sensory input alone is insufficient to account for this aspectual nature, that this aspectual nature is oftentimes 
experientally hidden, and that this aspect-grasping has an element of  “familiarity” or “recognition” that is 
not a thinking or a judging, but rather a certain bodily engagement. Seeing is always seeing-as. This point is 
supplemented by a second one about the relationship between aspects and doings.  
Wittgenstein realizes that the difficulties in analyzing perception are associated with the many 
phenomena and variations at play in perceptual experience (1982, §§579–583). His remarks on perception in 
the 30s and 40s are full of  fine distinctions involving the things we perceive and the aspects we perceive, as 
well as the ways in which we perceive and the relation of  the things we perceive with the things we say or 
do. Thus, next to the focus on the aspectual nature of  perception, Wittgenstein pays particular attention to 
the things we do in perception.  
To start with, we can ascertain that there is a difference between two very similar visual experiences of  
the same impression (like looking at a face that may be expressing either anger or disgust) in our mimicking 
them differently (Wittgenstein, 1982, §575), as we try to copy them (§598), in the ways we react to them 
(§§601-603), or in the descriptions we offer of  them, among others (§611). Notice that the perception and the 
accompanying action appear very close to each other, even entangled. Consider the two following remarks:  
 “What kind of  man is said to be enjoying this picture’s telling expression? Well, someone who looks 
at it this way, talks about it in such-and-such a way, and reacts to it this way” (Wittgenstein 1982, §471).  
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 “I have always seen it as a rabbit could even mean: for me it always was a rabbit, I have always spoken 
to it is a rabbit. A child does this.  
 It means that I have always treated it as a rabbit.” (Wittgenstein 1982, §§472).  
In both cases, Wittgenstein is calling into question the distance and the seeming difference between 
perception and action, specifically about action ensuing from the perception. In the first case, enjoying the 
“picture’s telling expression” requires a recognition of  such type of  expression. Since recognition entails 
something other than the mere visual impression —for we can think of  someone who does not enjoy the 
picture’s telling expression, perhaps because she does not see such telling expression—, so does the 
enjoyment. We then find that enjoying the picture amounts to a certain way of  looking and talking vis-a-vis 
the picture. In the second case, the implication is clearer: to see something as something means (under 
certain conditions) to treat it as something. Similarly, in experiencing a change of  aspect in an image 
(Aspektwechsel), Wittgenstein remarks how the change is expressed in what “I occupy myself  with,” which 
makes the experience of  change “similar to an action” (1982, §556).   
In similar remarks, like the following ones about hearing a melody and a spotted wall, Wittgenstein calls 
into question the distance between impression and action. First, the remarks involving hearing a melody: 
“Hearing a melody and the movements that go along with the particular way someone interprets 
(auffasst) or hears (hört) it.” (1982, §584).  
“It’s as if  doing and the impression didn’t happen side by side, but as if  doing shaped the impression” 
(1982, §586).  
“I hear it differently, and now I can play it differently. Thus I can render (wiedergeben) it differently.” 
(1982, §587).  
To begin with, notice how, even though the language of  impressions is gestured at, impressions appear 
already in experiential tones and not as a raw uptake of  information. A decision on whether impressions are 
the same in aspect changes is downplayed by Wittgenstein, since in order to decide this matter it is difficult 
to find criteria other than a description of  what is experienced (1982, §§609, 611).   
The case of  the melody shows the entanglement of  doing and perceiving so clearly that Wittgenstein 
asks: “Why does it seem so hard here to separate doing and experiencing?” (1982, §585). Sure it is the case 
that the doing could have shaped the impression, but there is more than an instrumental link between them. 
When dancing, a dancer’s listening to the music is modified by the dancing movements that put different 
emphases on sections or moments that carry more significance for the dancing. At the same time, the dancing 
is modified by the music as it is heard. How is a melody heard in different ways? It is heard differently by the 
emphasis one puts in the melodic or rhythmic aspects, in the sounds of  certain instruments, in the feeling 
conveyed by certain sections, etc. A dancer can only dance to nuances in the music he is able to listen to—yet 
not necessarily in a way that can be described or talked about. Since these nuances are more that isolated 
sounds, but rather melodic and rhythmic aspects of  it, a dancer can only relate to sequences that can be 
brought to have corporeal significance, including, naturally, stillness. The example has a counterpart in the 
case of  a player that plays a melody she recognizes, whom can be addressed in this way: “But surely when 
you play it you don’t play it anyhow, you play it in this particular way, making a crescendo here, a diminuendo 
there, a caesura in this place, etc.” (Wittgenstein 1965, 166; emphasis is the author’s). 
Hearing a melody is not a plain being impacted by sounds. While it can be shaped by dancing or moving, 
the taking of  sounds one way or another—always a “taking something for something” (Dafürhaltens)—is a 
certain doing.7 This is a doing even if  one is not conscious of  such doing, and even if  it seems to be a passive 
taking it all up. This relation is even clearer in the following remark: 
                              
7 Consider of reports made in “aesthetic observations”: “‘You have to hear these bars as an introduction,’ ‘You must hear 
it in this key,’ ‘You must phrase the theme like this’ (which can refer to hearing as well as to playing)” (Wittgenstein 
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“A wall covered with spots: and I occupy myself  by seeing faces on it: but not so that I can study the 
nature of  an aspect, but because I find those shapes interesting and because of  the destiny that leads me from 
one to the next.  
More and more, aspects dawn, others fade away, and sometime I ‘stare blindly’ at the wall”  (1982 §480) 
In this case, the doing is the perceiving itself, and it is specified as the perception is specified. Her 
occupying herself  with faces is her seeing faces. When she lets herself  be led by connections that arise on the 
go, there is also a doing, like when one plays to find forms in clouds. When the perceiver “stares blindly at the 
wall” it is because no specific aspect lights up--or rather, because the aspect consisting of  “lacking aspects” 
lights up. It is not because at that moment she is merely having an impression, as opposed to moments where 
impressions were accompanied by something else. In fact, an impression never exists apart from the being 
taken as one thing or another (Wittgenstein 1965, 169). 
Notice, however, that I have been treating all seeing the same, and all hearing the same, as if  what we do 
when we hear is always the same. That is a wrong assumption. The variations in different modes of  hearing, 
smelling, tasting, as well as other modal-specific and intermodal interactions, account for different types of  
interactions with objects. Different ways of  interacting perceptually with the world in the same modality 
would lose something fundamental if  they were reduced to a common type. There is, for instance, an 
enormous difference between hearing the sounds in the streets as a person walks on her way to take public 
transportation on her daily routine, without paying attention, and a seasoned dancer listening to a song while 
he dances to it in performative spirit. These two situations are different as well from the novice classical 
music spectator, listening to a long, obscure symphony, attempting to catch every detail. Or take the case of  
looking at a flower without looking at the color of  the flower—without being attentive of  it—and suddenly 
turn one’s attention to its color. Those are clearly two different ways of  seeing the flower (Wittgenstein 
1982, §721). These cases also reveal that perception, since it is a perception of  aspects, can be partly a 
voluntary act (Wittgenstein 1982, §§451, 453).  
These cases show differences as to the activity of  the perceiver in each instance, including what to focus 
on, how attentive the perceiver is in each case, and to what concrete end she perceives at the moment. But 
that is only one side of  the story about the differences in ways of  hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, or 
seeing. The analysis of  contextuality, performativity, expressivity, and normativity will explore the roles that 
different ways of  perceiving things play in our lives.  
Perception is a bodily engagement with the world happening at the level of  lived-experience, in which 
the phenomenal and the behavioral are indiscernible. This bodily engagement is a matter of  degrees of  
engagement “behind our utterances of  perception, engagement that reaches its highest intensity in the 
original immediacy of  the exclamation and its lowest in the silence of  habit or indifference” (Krebs, 2010, p. 
129). As Hurley argues, the conflict felt by many philosophers in putting actions and perceptions together 
comes from the programmatic assumption that perception and action are about inputs and outputs. However, 
the fine shades of  behavior that Wittgenstein explores deliver a different picture and question the input 
assumption. Behind this assumption, or rather beyond it, what is at stake is a way of  looking at ourselves—at 
what we are and at what we do. I follow Wittgenstein in looking for a theory of  perception that explains the 
connection between the sensory and the significance of  things for human existence: a theory of  perception 
in which we could recognize ourselves. It is essential to the social enactive account of  perception I put 
                              
1982, §632). A few remarks below, Wittgenstein says: “In aesthetics isn’t it essential that a picture or a piece of music, 
etc., can change its aspect for me?” (1982, §634). Part of the point here is that artistic experience very clearly expresses 
the fact that aspects are essential to perception. In a lab setting, where the subject is exposed to beeps or flashes of light, 
there may be not be much of an aspect, however significant the results of those experiments are for the purposes of 
understanding some physiological constraints or tendencies in perception, such as the quickness of associations or how 
fast can a human perceiver see or hear consecutive impulses. 
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forward, that we find this domain in meaningfulness specifically in perception, not only in our more general 
epistemology, as Noë would have it.  
The things we perceive matter in our lives, and this significance is exhibited in the ways in which we 
perceive. This is the basic insight I have been trying to motivate up to now and that I now will flesh out and 
develop as perceptual practices. Since ways of  doing things, in the sense here explored, are not individual but 
constitute social systems of  possibilities and appropriatenesses by which people live their lives, ways of  
doing things are forms of  life. Perceptual practices, my argument runs, are forms of  life.  
The performative element in the structure of  practices reflects part of  the behavior aspect. The 
performativity of  perceptual practices covers a wide range of  perceptual-based manifestations: 
encountering/exploring something and responding to it, and then also being able to produce similar 
perceptible material. Not all of  us may be able to compose music but we know how to inflect our voices in 
proper ways, and what to do in order to look good to others. Perception takes place in contexts, and is 
supported by the mastery of  a technique: a technique of  inspecting-perceiving, of  experiencing, of  
perceiving-responding and doing-producing. In this sense perception is the site of  commerce of  perceptible 
material that is ‘produced’ so as to be seen in a given way, and that is perceived as something, or, that elicits 
certain responses.8 It is in this wide-encompassing sense that practices are said to be forms of  life 
(Wittgenstein, 2009, pp. §§19, 23, 241). 
The notion of  perceptual practices has an answer to this issue for it encompasses a theory of  learning: 
learning practices are part of  social practices in general (in a specific social context) (Lave & Wenger, 1991). 
Social practices include ‘mechanisms’ by which newcomers are involved in the practices, by means of  the 
practices themselves. Thus, one learns to eat certain foods and eat them in a certain way, only by being given 
those foods and being suggested, or corrected, or forced to eat them in this or that way—that is, participating 
in eating practices. If  learning is then a sort of  getting used to rule-governed social practices, the outcome 
of  learning must a fortiori be the capacity to skillfully act appropriately in a given circumstance. The 
context, the capacities or abilities involved, the appropriateness of  actions are all specifically factors of  the 
type of  learning in question. In this framework, no “content” to be learned (this is not an issue for skills 
proper) exists independently of  a social practice in which it is grounded: one does not learn to eat in a 
certain way but in eating-related context (the dining table, or etiquette instruction). Even paradigmatic 
apparently standing-alone contents such as mathematical operations and language grammar are properly at 
home in real practices from which they are derived and which are able to change them. This being the case, it 
follows that having come to learn something amounts to being able to use it or articulate –even if  this means 
recitation or test-taking. And the practice itself, again, is what it is in its actual being practiced by a 
community. That is, the normative (rule-governed) character of  a practice does not come from the rules that 
we find in it, but in the fact that it is established as a practice—as opposed to an occurrence (of  which clearly 
normativity cannot be predicated). Rather, the rules that are isolated or abstracted find their validity in their 
standing on the ground of  the practice itself. This being so, learning something can arguably be a certain 
“agreement in” practice, which could be possible be broken down into judgments and actions (and perhaps 
some sort of  inner positioning).  
Perceptual practices are characterized by contextuality, performativity, expressivity, and normativity. 
Practices are contextual in that determination of  meanings, truth, and other normative aspects is only 
                              
8 With a different target in mind, this is very similar to the way in which Putnam refers to perceptions as transactions. 
On his view, partly inspired by Wittgenstein, the picture to get rid of is best exemplified in its extreme Berkeleyan case: 
we are never in direct contact with things. More subtle formulations will have it that the perception stands as an 
interface between external world and internal representations. Following Wittgenstein, Putnam insists in the fatality of 
this view for the comprehension of what we do and who we are. Back to the term transaction, it does not carry what my 
commerce does. Putnam’s analysis is still far from sociality in a direct way (Putnam, 1999). 
 16 
decidable by the whole concrete practices that happen over against specific social circumstances, including a 
physical environment. Practices are performative because they consist of  actions, reactions, and dispositions. 
Practices are expressive because they convey the form of  life of  communities. Practices are normative 
because they feature a dimension of  correctness and intelligibility—of  successfulness and pragmatic 
meaningfulness—that is grounded in the processes of  training by which new practitioners are brought into 
the community and by which the community continuously develops and transforms itself.  I do not have 
space to explore each one of  these elements in detail, even though each one would merit exclusive 
examination. For the time being, I have limited myself  to the performativity aspect, the one that most 
directly speaks about the enactive contrast between sensorimotor dependencies and perceptual practices. 
 
5. Socially Dependent Perception and Perceptual Practices 
I concluded section 3 saying that SDP’s centrality in human perception and sensorimotor enactivism’s 
inability to account for SDP, call for enactivism to articulate a better enactive notion. In section 4 I motivated 
a type of  social practices, perceptual practices, as the notion that should take the lead. In this section I 
explore in greater detail why perceptual practices satisfies the conclusion of  section 3.  
Perceivers are engaged with the world not in the mode of  judging, but in the manner that pertains 
specifically to perception: an immersed engagement with the world, that takes implicitly its structure for 
granted —just  as a walker typically takes the ground for granted— and actively relates to it in very 
immediate and involved ways. The perceivable world is formed of  perceptual continua—it is not about 
isolated snapshots but about a continuously perceiving of  objects over time, as they vary in themselves or in 
relation to a perceiver and in changing contexts. 
The things we perceive in the way we perceive them are relational and interactional, and to a great 
extent pragmatically dependent. We don’t experience the world in a pragmatic-less vacuum, but rather in the 
midst of  practices that give perceptual sense and purpose to our perceptual interactions and on which our 
experiences depend. What we perceive is to be understood in terms of  the multiplicity of  appearances in 
which objects, events, and states of  affairs present themselves to perceivers differently constituted and 
located spatially, temporally, and pragmatically.  
The point is that in our being engaged with the world certain appearances take place, in virtue of  the 
interaction—but they are not made up by us. These experiences are the type of  thing that either only exist 
in an interaction—such as an object in a scene on which one ‘focuses’—or are afforded by an interaction—as 
a flavor that changes for a subject depending on the combinations of  things eaten, or as colors are 
perceivable properties for seeing beings, not for non-seeing ones.  
In this section I want to revisit the three cases of  section 2, this time focusing on three structural 
features of  perception, which appear in socially dependent perceptions and are accounted for satisfactorily by 
perceptual practices, namely: attentional focus, what's perceptually salient in the world, and modal-specific 
harmony-like relations. One can think of  these features as property-based: attention-related properties, 
salience properties, and harmony-like-properties.9 
These three features and their related properties are enacted by the things we do and the way we do 
them, and are excluded from the sensorimotor framework. Perceptual practices, instead, encompass ways of  
doing that are not only about moving our bodies and attaining points of  view that would yield the same 
perspectival view to anybody else.  
Attentional focus refers to a way of  engaging with perceptual objects, such that we make present or are 
more attentive to some parts of  the sensory field. The wholes and parts in vision case, presented social 
                              
9 While I believe that nothing in argument hinges on adopting or not talk of properties at this point, going one way or 
another could be done without trouble. 
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cognition showing precisely how perceptual differences can be due to differences in attention, as a result of  
cultural “styles” of  seeing. These styles of  seeing, characterized in this case by context dependence versus 
context independence, are perceptual practices. Well-known change-blindness cases --those that reveal that 
may be blind to what we are not expecting, regardless of  whether our sensory endings are excited by the 
physical impulses-- also illustrate that perception is not about the passive receiving of  ‘the way the world is,’ 
but is rather a take on the way the world is.  
By perceptual salience, I refer to the fact that there are aspects of  the world that we are more familiar 
with, which often implies that we engage with them more often and develop a greater mastery of  them. This 
salience occurs in flavors, smells, colors, textures, and sounds. The case of  ritualized and habitual food 
consumption can be at least partly explained by the fact that, to different populations, different aspects of  the 
world are salient and carry positive associations.  
Salient aspects of  the sensory field, for instance, in the chemical senses, can be explained through social 
ways of  doing things with beverages, foods, perfumes, style of  urban/house cleanliness, where certain flavors 
and smells are more usual in a context and are therefore more salient in everyday life. These ways of  doing 
things are, for instance, the very practices by which, say, cilantro, is more or less used, or by which, given the 
wide prevalence of  cilantro in a population's diet, new ways of  cooking appear that may downplay the soapy 
notes of  cilantro, even for those who are inclined to taste it based on genetic pre-dispositions, which, as I 
explored in section 1, can be overcome.  
As I explained in section 1, sensorimotor enactivism is toothless when it comes to understanding cases 
like cilantro hedonics, or other cases that follow from the salience of  aspects of  the sensory field for different 
perceivers. This is of  course the case anywhere salience is not defined merely spatially, which is in most 
cases.  
Perceptual practices as the central concept in an enactivism turned social enactivism, allows us to 
understand why some people relate to some parts of  the sensory field in the ways they do: more often, in 
more varied ways, and why those ways are linked to a hightened enjoyment of  things. To be clear, the point 
is not that the sheer capacity for enjoying cilantro depends on the food we cook with it, since that, as I have 
shown, is partly determined by biological facts.  
Third, harmony-like sensory modal-specific relations depend upon habituation to combinations: the 
colors people from different culture use (and don’t use) as matching (e.g. in clothing), or flavors paired in 
practice as complementary. The practice of  combining sensory properties in certain ways and not in others, 
whereas with colors in clothing, with smells in perfumes or soaps, or with flavors in food and drinks, are 
examples of  perceptual practices.  Going back to the case of  cilantro, the mastery of  what goes well with 
cilantro and what doesn't, the experience of  specific combinations of  that flavor with other flavors, or the 
experience of  flavors that taste home-like for some people cannot be explained by sensorimotor dependencies 
whereas perceptual practices can. 
And yet, in a full account of  perception, sensorimotor dependencies do have a place, since they matter in 
visual perception. There is no denying that spatiality and perspective are constitutive of  visual experience, in 
many respects just in the way Noë has explained. But their role is much smaller than suggested by 
sensorimotor enactivism both by 1) the senses that go untouched by sensorimotor dependencies, and by 2) 
the pervasive features just described (attention, salience, and harmony-like relations). Perceptual practices 
can encompass sensorimotor dependencies since even ways of  moving are at times specified socially. At the 
very least, perceptual practices supplement sensorimotor dependencies, and, if  my analysis is right, these 
practices take precedence in epistemological and ontological ways in perception.10    
                              
10 I submit that it is not unreasonable to suggest that even some sensorimotor dependencies are subordinate to perceptual 
practices. Briefly put, while the relations are objective in the sense that they would obtain for any perceiver entering into 
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Perceptual practices have the power to explain socially dependent perceptions (SDPs), which are central 





                              
such and such relations, there are ways of  exploring things that are more common, in a way distinctive, of  social groups. 
We just need to imagine architects and car designers in their particular way of  achieving certain perspectives to be 
included in richer, more detailed spatial-design outlook on things. Another example may be that of  the levels of  tolerable 
proximity (personal space and interpersonal distance) and intensity of  visual explorations in interpersonal interactions. 
It is my personal experience, for instance, that many Colombians come closer to interlocutors than, say, US-Americans 
do, and are more inquisitive with their eyes in exploring the features of  another person even in public spaces, which 
contrasts with the way people from other countries, cultures, or groups do. This means that some perspectival relations 
with the facial features of  other people depend on the distance that is typical for people of  a culture to maintain from 
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